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Abstract 
 
This paper addresses the current discussion on links between party politics and production re-
gimes. Why do German Social Democrats opt for more corporate governance liberalization than 
the CDU although, in terms of the distributional outcomes of such reforms, one would expect the 
situation to be reversed? I divide my analysis into three stages. First, I use the European Parlia-
ment’s crucial vote on the European takeover directive in July 2001 as a test case to show that the 
left-right dimension does indeed matter in corporate governance reform, beside cross-class and 
cross-party nation-based interests. In a second step, by analyzing the party positions in the main 
German corporate governance reforms in the 1990s, I show that the SPD and the CDU behave 
“paradoxically” in the sense that the SPD favored more corporate governance liberalization than 
the CDU, which protected the institutions of “Rhenish,” “organized” capitalism. This constellation 
occurred in the discussions on company disclosure, management accountability, the power of 
banks, network dissolution, and takeover regulation. Third, I offer two explanations for this para-
doxical party behavior. The first explanation concerns the historical conversion of ideas. I show 
that trade unions and Social Democrats favored a high degree of capital organization in the Wei-
mar Republic, but this ideological position was driven in new directions at two watersheds: one in 
the late 1940s, the other in the late 1950s. My second explanation lies in the importance of con-
flicts over managerial control, in which both employees and minority shareholders oppose mana-
gers, and in which increased shareholder power strengthens the position of works councils. 
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1 
1 Introduction 
 
This paper is a contribution to the discussion of the impact of political variables on production regimes. 
An increasing part of the debate on national models of capitalism concerns the impact of party politics on 
the organization of production regimes and how this impact is mediated by such institutions as the elec-
toral system and other features of majoritarian versus consociational democracies. Two different, but 
compatible and complementary ways of designing such research can be distinguished. The first way is to 
focus on macro variables such as consociational democracy and the organizational features of production 
regimes as a whole. For example, Gourevitch and Hawes (2002: 244–251) point out that most organized 
economies are consociational democracies, which can be explained by their tendency to include the inter-
ests of labor into politics and by the absence of radical political shifts, which fits in with stable long-term 
relations between different stakeholder groups. An alternative way of connecting politics with production 
regimes is to deconstruct the concept of organized economies and to test the partisan hypothesis for dif-
ferent subsystems of production regimes, countries, and points in history. Production regimes are con-
glomerates of quite different features, such as the corporate governance sphere, industrial relations, com-
petition policy, skill formation, and the welfare regime. It is an open question whether or not parties and 
political institutions affect different subsystems in the same way: obviously, leftist parties in government 
tend to favor more codetermination rights for employees than conservative and liberal parties do, but 
there is no way of concluding from this that leftists also favor a greater degree of organization for the cor-
porate governance sphere. In addition, the impact of parties may differ from country to country, being de-
pendent on different institutional settings and historical experiences. 
 
Both research strategies should be combined, as both are associated with different advantages and prob-
lems: comparison and analysis of macro variables reveal overall trends, but lack depth of sharpness, while 
case studies are detailed, but lack the proof of whether the findings represent typical or exceptional cases. 
However, the debate on national models of capitalism has identified paradigmatic cases of production re-
gimes, such as Germany and Japan as typical cases of organized economies, and the United States and the 
United Kingdom as the most liberal market economies. This paper focuses on Germany in the 1990s by 
combining two lines of inquiry: corporate governance research and the “parties-do-matter approach.” I 
will show that the German Social Democrats opt for more corporate governance liberalization than the 
Christian Democrats, which seems to violate expectations based on partisan theory. In fact, in the field of 
the market for corporate governance, Social Democrats instead of Christian Democrats tend to be the 
market-enforcing party. I will present two explanations for this paradoxical outcome: the conversion of 
leftist ideas after the Second World War, and the importance of conflicts over managerial control in 
which both shareholders and employees oppose managers. 
 
The internationalization of financial markets has put European production regimes under pressure to lib-
eralize. In the 1980s, European integration led to competition-oriented reforms of national business loca-
tions (Cerny 1997). Beginning in the mid-1990s, reforms were extended to the corporate governance 
spheres of production systems, resulting in the reform of stock exchange organization, company supervi-
sion, disclosure practices, minority shareholder protection, regulation of management compensation, and 
takeover regulation (McCann 2001; Cioffi 2002; Goyer 2002; Gregory 2000; Hansmann/Kraakman 2001; 
Hyytinen et al. 2002; Roe 2000, 2001). 
 
                                                   
I would like to thank Andreas Broscheid, Richard Deeg, Bernhard Ebbinghaus, Peter A. Gourevitch, Torben 
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However, little is known about how party interests affect such reforms. Political science has pointed out 
that political parties have different socio-economic voter clienteles, which affects party ideologies (Budge
/Robertson 1987), preferred policies (Schmidt 2002) and, as a result, political outcomes (Alt 1985; Alva-
rez et al. 1991; Hibbs 1977, 1992; Hicks/Swank 1992; Wilensky 2002). Party differences are most likely 
to emerge in policy issues with distinct distributional outcomes. As it is a long way from party ideologies 
to economic outcomes (Imbeau et al. 2001; Schmidt 1996), differences in party ideology are greater than 
differences in implemented policies, which in turn are greater than differences in outcomes.1 Marked party 
differences have been described by welfare state research (Kwon/Pontusson 2002; Wilensky 2002). By 
contrast, findings on party differences in macroeconomic outcomes such as unemployment, inflation and 
growth seem to be unstable and very sensitive with respect to the observed time period. The idea that cor-
porate governance arrangements are shaped by partisan politics was chiefly described by Roe, who points 
out that “social democracies widen the natural gap between managers and distant shareholders, and im-
pede firms from developing the tools that would close up the gap” (Roe 2000: 19). This, according to 
Roe, leads to high degrees of ownership concentration and impedes the development of markets for cor-
porate control (see also Bebchuk/Roe 1999: 37; Gilson/Roe 1999: 265). 
 
2 European Corporate Governance Reform and Party Behavior 
 
Corporate governance deals with the regulation of power over corporations and differs from country to 
country as well as over time. Different laws and cultures provide owners of large share blocks, minority 
shareholders, managers, banks, regional and state authorities, employees and trade unions with different 
degrees of access to the control of company policy. The main differences have been identified between 
the Anglo-American style “shareholder-oriented” systems and Continental European “stakeholder sys-
tems,” in which ownership structures are more concentrated and banks, the state, works councils and trade 
unions limit the power of shareholders (La Porta et al. 2000). However, as Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
have argued, the German, Japanese and US corporate governance systems may differ with respect to 
mechanisms and distributional outcomes, but they are functional equivalents in the sense that all three 
systems supervise managers effectively and have supported the economic success of the particular nation. 
 
This paper sets out by focusing on takeover regulation. Institutions that regulate takeover markets are stra-
tegically decisive characteristics of production regimes. Hostile takeovers are governance mechanisms to 
force managers to act in a shareholder-oriented way (Manne 1965). Agency theorists argue that share 
prices will fall when managers lack shareholder orientation. Low share prices create incentives for take-
overs, as the new owners may increase shareholder orientation, raise profits and, as a consequence, boost 
share prices. The difference between former and recent company price is the takeover premium. The 
greater the takeover premium is, the greater is the likelihood of takeovers. Therefore, managers who oper-
ate in corporate governance systems that permit hostile takeovers should behave in a shareholder-oriented 
manner in order to prevent hostile takeovers. Empirical studies have indicated that the effects of hostile 
takeovers are more limited than economic theory would suggest (see, as an overview, Höpner/Jackson 
2001: 5–14). However, it is widely accepted that markets for hostile takeovers are the main characteristics 
of “shareholder-oriented” systems of corporate governance, while “stakeholder-oriented” systems lack 
hostile takeovers (de Jong 1997; Hall/Soskice 2001: 27–28; Streeck 2001). Consequently, the emergence 
of markets for hostile takeovers in Europe is likely to push the “Rhenish” models of capitalism in more 
market-driven, liberal directions (Hall /Soskice 2001: 61; Höpner/Jackson 2001; Streeck 2001). The main 
                                                   
1In addition to this, it is also a long way from economic outcomes to satisfying people. That is why the most far-
reaching “long-shot” hypothesis on party effects was claimed by Radcliff et al. (2000), who argue that people are 
happier when leftist parties are in government. 
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matter of dispute in European takeover regulation has been the extent to which it would promote or im-
pede hostile takeovers. 
 
Why should there be an underlying left-right dimension to this disagreement? First, the procedure for 
company decision-making is likely to change when hostile takeovers occur. Where codetermination rights 
allow works councils and trade unions to discuss investment decisions, hostile takeovers might thwart the 
results of negotiation, as hostile takeovers replace the managements that have been the former bargaining 
partners. In contrast to “normal” changes in company strategies, hostile takeovers are exclusively decided 
by capital market participants and cannot be codetermined. In addition, in the case of takeovers by foreign 
companies, degrees of codetermination decrease as financial decisions are transferred to non-
codetermined foreign holding companies. 
 
Second, the rule of thumb that the design of economic institutions has distributional outcomes also holds 
true for the institutions that regulate takeovers. A crucial insight of the literature on different models of 
capitalism is that they tend to distribute welfare in dissimilar ways (Hall /Soskice 2001: 21). De Jong 
(1997) has pointed out that the distribution of the net value added of firms among shareholders, employ-
ees, the state, banks and retained earnings varies with respect to the likelihood of hostile takeovers. In sys-
tems that include hostile takeovers as governance mechanisms, firms distribute more value added to 
shareholders, while the percentages of value added that employees receive as wages, as well as retained 
earnings, are relatively low. Conversely, in systems that are characterized by the absence of hostile take-
overs, ratios of wages and retained earnings tend to be higher. The mechanism behind this distributional 
pattern is the conflict of goals between company growth and profitability growth. Continental European 
companies have more scope to invest in company growth even if these investments do not increase profit-
ability. As a consequence, German corporations tend to be bigger, but less profitable and less valued by 
capital market participants compared to UK companies. This is in the interest of managers and employ-
ees, but thwarts the interests of shareholders, who would gain an extra profit if “their” companies 
switched from the “high growth – low valuation” equilibrium to a “low growth – high valuation” point 
(Höpner/Jackson 2001: 12–14; de Jong 1997). Beyer and Hassel (2002) have shown that this mechanism 
changed the distribution of net value added in shareholder-oriented German companies in the 1990s. Fur-
ther evidence comes from the “breach of trust” literature (Shleifer /Summers 1988; Deakin et al. 2002), 
which shows that shareholders’ gains from hostile takeovers tend to result not from increased efficiency, 
but from the breach of implicit contracts with employees. To sum up, company governance by takeover 
markets might undermine distributional compromises to the disadvantage of employees. 
 
The third reason why the argument over takeover regulation and corporate governance regulation as a 
whole should be affected by the ideological left-right dimension is rather theoretical. In the debate on dif-
ferent national models of capitalism, political economists have highlighted the existence of institutional 
complementarity between different spheres of production regimes, such as the corporate governance 
sphere, the industrial relations sphere, the education and training system, and even the welfare state. The 
idea is that these institutions are in a balanced relationship to each other, which should make major 
changes in only one of these spheres unlikely, although radical shifts in one sphere ought to affect institu-
tional stability in other spheres also. There is no consensus among political economists on the extent and 
the strength of such complementarity, and some scholars find hybridizations between elements of liberal 
and organized market economies more conceivable than others. 
 
The extent of complementarity between different spheres of production regimes is the latest point of con-
tention in the models of capitalism debate. But, in the end, all scholars seem to agree that there are in-
terferences between institutions that govern the economy, and also, to some extent, that there are elective 
affinities that make some combinations of institutions more likely and coherent than others (Amable 
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2000; Aoki 2001; Boyer 1998; Hall/Soskice 2001; Jackson 2001; Streeck 1991; Whitley 1999). Since 
centralized wage bargaining, codetermination, trade union participation, and a welfare regime that pro-
tects employees against the loss of specific investments are seen as integral parts of organized market 
economies (Gourevitch 2002; Hall /Soskice 2001: 24–25; Iversen/Soskice 2001) – and since these institu-
tions represent typical goals of leftist movements and parties – there should be general support among 
leftist parties for the main institutions of organized market economies.2 This should include an aversion to 
markets for hostile takeovers, which are a characteristic feature of shareholder-oriented, liberal market 
economies (see also Roe 2001). 
 
These three considerations lead to the main subject matter of this paper, which is the expectation that left-
ist parties, including the left parties of the center, should favor market-restricting corporate governance 
institutions that are associated with organized corporate governance regimes and, in particular, that they 
should oppose regulations that promote hostile takeovers. Conversely, rightist and liberal parties should 
favor institutions that enhance the role of capital markets in company monitoring and should opt in the 
main for the introduction of markets for hostile takeovers. 
 
2.1 The Battle Over the Takeover Directive 
 
The aim of this section is to develop an initial indication of how European parties and corporate regula-
tion interact as a whole. I will test the partisan hypothesis on a macro level by comparing the behavior of 
seventy-five different European parties. This will allow localization of the attitude of German parties, de-
scribed in detail in the subsequent sections, on a broader landscape. 
 
I use the crucial vote over the conciliation compromise on the European Commission’s takeover directive 
that took place on July 4, 2001, in the European Parliament as a test case for the behavior of European 
parties toward corporate governance liberalization. Until the 1980s, hostile bids in most continental Euro-
pean countries were so rare that no special regulation was seen as being necessary. Mergers and acquisi-
tions activity was low, and acquisitions were based on negotiations and not on hostile bids (Bergloef/
Burkart 2002). In the late 1980s and 1990s, European mergers and acquisitions activity increased remark-
ably, and some of these acquisitions were hostile takeovers. It was the spectacular Vodafone/Mannesmann 
takeover battle in particular that brought takeover regulation, a long-since disputed matter of European in-
tegration, back on the agenda. The directive, which was twelve years in the making – the first proposal 
was presented in 1989 –, was part of the Commission’s goal to create a common European capital market. 
The European Council of Ministers developed a common position on the basis of the 1999 Action Plan 
for Financial Services. The European Parliament amended the common position in June 2000, and a joint 
text was agreed by a Conciliation Committee in June of 2001. 
 
The directive would have created a common European framework for takeovers and would have resulted 
in a liberal body of rules conducive to hostile takeovers. The sticking point was article nine of the pro-
posed directive. This stipulated that, in the case of hostile takeover bids, shareholders needed to approve 
in advance any defensive measures taken by the target company. The only exception allowed would be 
the case of a company attempting to find an alternative bidder, the so-called “white knight.” The oppo-
nents claimed that this framework was too liberal and would leave European companies unprotected 
against hostile bids from “Wall Street sharks.” In opposition to the Commission’s attitude, critics wanted 
to allow the boards of target companies to take defensive action if they had sought shareholders’ authori-
zation no earlier than eighteen months before the period of acceptance of the bid, which, of course, would 
                                                   
2For a general discussion on the interaction of parties and the characteristics of productions systems such as skill 
formation, see Gourevitch (2002: 25–29). 
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have adjusted the balance of power in favor of target companies and to the disadvantage of hostile bid-
ders. The main opponent against the Council’s position was the German government, and 99 percent of 
the German MEPs voted against the directive.3 
 
The Commission proposal needed an absolute majority of the votes cast in parliament. On July 4, the par-
liament rejected the Conciliation compromise on the Commission’s proposed directive in a tie vote, in 
which 273 members of the European Parliament voted for the compromise and 273 voted against it. Sup-
porters of the compromise claimed that the voting behavior of MEPs damaged the credibility of the par-
liament, and that this was a setback for the common goal to create a single European market. However, as 
far political economy research is concerned, the July 4 incident is a godsend, as it is perfectly suited to 
use as an empirical test case for the partisan hypothesis, for several reasons. First, every relevant Euro-
pean party in every European member state had to form an opinion on this corporate governance liberali-
zation issue. Second, the point of reference – the Conciliation compromise – was the same for every party 
in each member state. Third, all MEPs had to vote simultaneously, which keeps the time factor constant. 
And, fourth, every European party knew that the voting result would be extremely close, so everyone was 
aware that the behavior of their own European parliamentary subgroup might be decisive in the end. 
There was no scope for symbolic voting behavior. In fact, the killing of the European takeover directive 
seems to have been the most relevant decision the European Parliament has ever made, with the exception 
of the refusal to exculpate the European Commission in December 1998, which led to the resignation of 
the whole Commission in March 1999. The crucial point here is not that the directive was rejected, but 
that the voting argument allows us to identify the main dimensions that made national parties in Europe 
decide either for or against the directive. 
 
2.2 Dependent and Independent Variables4 
 
In 2001, the 626 members of the Fifth European Parliament elected in 1999 were delegated from fifteen 
member states and belonged to eight political groups: 
– the Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats (PPE-DE), 
– the Group of the Party of European Socialists (PSE), 
– the Group of the European Liberal, Democrat and Reformist Party (ELDR), 
– the Confederal Group of the European United Left /Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL), 
– the Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance (Verts/ALE), 
– the Union for the Europe of the Nations Group (UEN), 
– the Group for a Europe of Democracies and Diversities (EDD) and 
– the Technical Group of Independent Members (TDI). 
 
By crossing national affiliation and political group affiliation, I divided the European Parliament into sev-
enty-five subgroups. The percentage of MEPs of each subgroup – Danish Conservatives, British Labor 
Party members, Swedish Greens and so on – that agreed with the takeover directive is the dependent vari-
able. Therefore, the dependent variable varies from 0 (for example, German Social Democrats) to 100 
(for example, Spanish Liberals).5 
 
                                                   
3One German PPE-DE member supported the directive. German Social Democrats and Greens voted uniformly 
against it. German Liberals failed to achieve the 5 percent vote in the 1999 elections.  
4For data sources, see Appendix. 
5For help in the construction of this variable, I would like to thank Simone Leiber from the Max Planck Institute in 
Cologne. 
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The main independent variable is the ideological affiliation of the subgroups. As the hypothesis to be 
tested is that there is an underlying left-right dimension to the range of corporate governance reforms, the 
subgroups had to be sorted into left-right categories. An obvious problem is to find an adequate position 
for the Liberal parties that tend to be left of center in questions of human rights, but right of center in the 
issue of the extent to which free markets should be modified by non-market institutions. Hearl’s analysis 
(1988: 444–445) of 1000 party manifestos and party documents from fourteen countries demonstrates that 
Liberal parties have a “right-of-center bias indicated by the liberals’ rather higher than average placings 
on such issues as free enterprise, incentives, economic orthodoxy” (about which see also Iversen/Soskice 
2002: 10). As the dispute over the market for hostile takeovers fits exactly into this dimension, Liberal 
parties should tend to agree more with the takeover directive than the parties of the center. Therefore, by 
using a simple ordinal measure and by referring to the five main party families that Kitschelt (2003) dis-
tinguishes, the parties were indexed as follows: Leftist and Green Parties (GUE/NGL and Verts/  ALE): 1, 
Socialists and Social Democrats (PSE): 2, Christian Democrat and Conservative Parties (PPE-DE): 3, Lib-
erals (ELDR): 4, Rightist Parties6 (UEN): 5.7 
 
I included several controls. The most important control variable represents national, party cohesive inter-
ests. It is obvious that some countries would profit more, while others would suffer more, from a free 
market for hostile takeovers. As corporate governance systems and capital market arrangements differ 
from country to country, companies in some countries are more likely to be the targets of hostile takeover 
attempts than others. Where economic institutions promote capital market orientation, companies tend to 
be higher valued by capital market participants, which – in the cases of shares used as takeover currencies 
– makes them stronger in takeover battles. In addition, companies tend to have better access to risk capital 
for speculative takeovers where capital markets are highly developed. Conversely, companies in the con-
text of corporate governance systems that promote company growth more than profitability growth should 
tend to be cheaper for raiders, and the potential takeover premium should be higher. As a measure of 
these differences, I use the La Porta et al. index on Shareholders’ Rights that indicates the extent to which 
a corporate governance system is designed to benefit capital market participants’ interests. This index has 
six ranks and ranges from 0 (Belgium) to 5 (UK). 
 
A further control should accommodate the fact that every parliament is characterized by its own voting 
characteristics, which may have some systematic influence on the observed data and may not wash out in 
the regression. Hix (2001: 673) has pointed out that such a dynamic is the “government-opposition” dy-
namic. As parties that belong to the governments of the European member states have had more chance to 
gain influence in the European Council compared to national oppositions, there may have been a tendency 
for national opposition parties to oppose the takeover directive more than parties in government. The gov-
ernment-opposition variable is binary coded (1=party is in national government, 0=party is member of 
                                                   
6Similar to the Liberals, it is not self-evident that rightist parties are really on the far right in economic issues, as 
German rightist parties have experimented with a combination of far-right positions on the liberal versus authori-
tarian axis, but interventionist and redistributive positions on the socio-economic axis. But, as Kitschelt (1995: 66) 
points out, this is an exception to the rule, and “the rightist parties in all countries but Germany are the most radi-
cally procapitalist in their own party system” (see also Betz 1994: 109–119). 
7The Technical Group of Independent Members (TDI) was not indexed in the ideological affiliation variable as this 
group was simply set up to profit from the status of a parliamentary faction, which was exactly the reason why the 
European Court decided to disintegrate the group. The Group for a Europe of Democracies and Diversities (EDD), 
consisting of members from Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the UK, is a borderline case. Their ideological 
characteristic is anti-Europeanism, which should be assessed as being right from center. It was decided not to index 
them in the left-right dimension. However, it should be noted that an inclusion of this group would have supported 
the tested hypothesis, as most of the EDD members agreed with the takeover directive. 
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home country’s opposition). A second conflict that is typical for the European level is the conflict be-
tween large and small member states, in which small member states claim to be excluded by the large 
states when main reforms are informally prepared. Therefore, country size, measured by the number of 
residents, was included. 
 
Nation-specific attitudes toward takeover regulation may also be influenced by national economic busi-
ness activity, as expanding corporations may be more interested in a takeover-facilitating framework than 
companies in stagnation. In order to control for this possibility, national GDP growth in the half decade 
before the vote of the European Parliament was calculated. This control varies from 9.01 percent (Ger-
many) to 41.01 percent for the Irish economy, which was expanding enormously in the 1990s. 
 
Results of Analysis 
 
Table 1 shows the results of three OLS regression equations,8 using the voting behavior of MEPs as de-
pendent variables and both ideological affiliation of European Parliament subgroups and different combi-
nations of controls as independent variables. The equations indicate a strong influence of ideological af-
filiation in the predicted direction. In each of the three equations, the ideological affiliation variable is 
significant at the 0.01 level. The non-standardized regression coefficients can be interpreted as percentage  
point differences. Assuming constant ideological differences between  the  five  distinguished  ideological  
                                                   
8As the dependent variable varies between 0 and 100 – similar to unemployment rates or ratios of public expendi-
ture, which can by definition never be lower than 0 or larger then 100 – an alternative to OLS regression would have 
been a logistic regression. However, I argue that the strength of the results indicate that the replacement of the OLS 
method with logistic regression would not alter the results. I thank Andreas Broscheid for drawing my attention to 
this problem. 
Table 1 Determinants of Voting Behaviora 
Variable Prediction Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 
Constant  26.523
(11.825) 
19.846 
(16.965)
18.224
(17.380)
Ideological affiliation  22.920***
(3.295)
22.529***
(3.361)
22.739***
(3.439)
La Porta et al. index  9.082***
(3.257)
11.748***
(4.172)
– 
Party in national government  – 9.766 
(9.024)
4.671
(9.047)
Country size 2001  – 0.169 
(0.203)
0.033
(0.195)
GDP growth 1995–2001  – 0.657 
(0.793)
0.685
(0.648)
N  75 75 75 
R2 (adj.)  0.474 0.464 0.403
OLS Regression Results with standard errors in parentheses. Missing values: see definitions
and sources of variables; variables excluded pair-wise. *** p<0.01. Software: SPSS. 
a Dependent variable: Percentages of subgroup members that voted in agreement with the
takeover directive. 
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blocks, a change from one block to the next block on the right is associated with an approximately 23 per-
cent increase of subgroup members in agreement with the takeover directive. The incorporation of con-
trols does not affect the magnitude and significance of this effect. 
 
However, these results suggest greater explanatory power for the ideological affiliation variable than 
they actually have. Figure 1 shows that the strong relationship between ideological affiliation and voting 
behavior (r=.95***, six party families) is exclusively driven by leftist, green, liberal and rightist parties. 
These groups behave as predicted. In contrast to this, the prediction that there should be differences in 
voting behavior between Social Democrats and Conservative or Christian Democrat parties does not hold 
true. 49.4 percent of PSE members and 44.8 percent of PPE-DE members agreed with the takeover direc-
tive. Furthermore, in 13 out of 15 national cases, the majorities of Socialist and Christian Democrat /Con-
servative subgroup members voted together. The data show that there actually is a left-right dimension to 
the investigated corporate governance liberalization issue. But, as 65 percent of all MEPs belong to either 
the PSE or the PPE-DE groups, the voting behavior of a large part of MEPs was affected by other considera-
tions. 
 
For Social Democrats, Conservatives and Christian Democrats, national interests mattered more than dif-
ferences in ideological affiliation. Table 1 shows that the La Porta et al. index on the development of na-
tional financial markets has a strong and significant influence on the agreement with the 2001 takeover di-
rective. According to equations 1 and 3, every one-step increase in the six-ranked index results in a 12 
percent increase in agreement with the suggested liberal takeover regulation. Figure 2 shows that the fi-
Figure 1 Parties and Agreement with the Takeover Directive
Percentage of members in agreement 
with the takeover directive
Left-right axis on liberalization in socio-economic issues
r = .95, (adj.) = .87 R2
Liberal Parties
Rightist Parties
Social Democratic Parties
Green Parties
Leftist Parties
Conservative and Christian 
Democratic Parties
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1 2 3 4 5
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nancial market orientation of corporate governance institutions explains the voting behavior of center 
party members to a large extent. In Belgium, Italy, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands and Austria, where 
the magnitude of capital market orientation is below average, Social Democrats and Christian Democrats/
Conservatives tended to vote against the directive. In Finland, France, Portugal, Sweden, Ireland and the 
UK, where minority shareholders’ rights are indicated to be above average, majorities of center party 
members agreed with the corporate governance liberalization issue. Table 1 indicates no significant influ-
ence of other control variables.9 To sum up, analysis shows that the voting behavior of leftists, Greens, 
Liberals10 and rightist party members was affected by their ideological affiliation, while Social Democrats, 
Christian Democrats and Conservatives voted with respect to their national affiliation. 
 
Why did MEPs of the center from countries with less capital-market-oriented corporate governance re-
gimes tend to oppose a liberal takeover regulation? The weapons in hostile takeover battles are share 
prices. Share prices vary with profitability, which is greatly affected by the institutions that regulate com-
pany behavior in the conflict of goals between company growth and profitability growth. As mentioned 
above, German companies tend to be much bigger, but much lower valued by capital market participants, 
compared to UK companies. Therefore the “share price weapon” tends to be more developed in countries 
with high levels of capital market orientation. In addition, politicians from organized economies might be 
more sensitive to the “breach of trust” problem: organized economies such as Germany’s rely more than 
liberal market economies on the willingness of employees to invest in company-specific skills (Hall /
Soskice 2001). This increases the amount of both implicit and explicit contracts with employees that 
might be breached by successful hostile raiders, which might undermine the preconditions for the com-
parative advantage of organized economies. 
 
By using data covering twenty-one OECD countries, Table 2 shows correlations between the La Porta et al. 
index and other institutional variables, which explore further characteristics of the different country 
groups. Not surprisingly, transparency and share dispersion tend to be higher in countries with capital-
market-oriented corporate governance systems. The high correlation between the La Porta et al. index and 
the Hall /Gingerich index of overall production regime coordination shows that countries with less capi-
tal-market-oriented production regimes display further attributes of organized market economies. This in-
dex was constructed by using data on the degrees and levels of wage coordination (Hall /Gingerich 2001), 
among other measures. As Table 2 indicates, there is also a high and significant negative correlation be-
tween the shareholder orientation of corporate governance systems and employment protection. Employ-
ment protection tends to be lower when capital market orientation is high. The protection of different 
economic groups has different priorities in different countries, which affects outcomes such as company 
size, profitability and share prices. A liberal takeover regulation is likely to strengthen capital-market-
oriented companies and to push others into a more capital-market-oriented direction. To conclude the em-
pirical analysis of the voting behavior of European parties in July 2001, I demonstrate that none of the 
variables discussed in this section rule out the explanatory power of ideological affiliation and the La 
Porta et al. index (Table 3). By using all nine measures as independent variables in one regression, there 
still remains support for the findings of equations 1–3 in Table 1, while none of the four additionally in-
cluded and moderately inter-correlated variables acquires a significant result. 
                                                   
9 Because of heterogeneous error variances of the dependent variable, standard errors might be overestimated, 
which raises doubt as to the acceptance of the null hypotheses. I thank Andreas Broscheid for pointing this out. 
10 The voting of the Liberals is also interesting with respect to the uniformity of their voting. Research on Euro-
pean party systems has emphasized on the lack of homogeneity of the liberal party family and the ELD group in 
the European Parliament (Hix 2002: 689; Kreppel /Tsebelis 1999: 957; Smith 1988: 16; Steed/Humphreys 
1988: 396).  
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As my analysis has shown, two dimensions explain differences in the attitudes of European parties to-
ward the liberalization of corporate governance: first, the ideological affiliation of parties on the left-
right axis; and, second, national institutional configurations, especially the national interests resulting 
from the degree of shareholder orientation of national corporate governance systems, which is highly cor-
related with the degree of overall production regime coordination.11 So far, resistance to the pressures for 
further European-wide corporate governance liberalization should be anticipated where leftist parties are 
strong and where national configurations shape the characteristics of organized economies, such as low 
degrees of shareholder orientation, vocational training systems that create company specific skills, com-
pany networks, and high degrees of wage coordination. Laterally reversed, liberalization is likely to be 
pursued where not only current shareholder orientation is strong, but also where other characteristic fea-
tures of organized market economies are absent and where leftist parties are weak. 
 
3 The German Party Paradox 
 
The analysis has shown that there actually is an underlying left-right dimension to the discussion on cor-
porate governance liberalization. The existence of a second, national and cross-pary dimension might lead 
to a reduced significance of the first dimension. But it does not explain why national parties might behave 
paradoxically in the sense that they change their position on the left-right scale with another party. In the 
following section, I will show that the German SPD supported more corporate governance liberalization 
than its rightist neighbor in the German party system, the CDU. 
 
                                                   
11This finding fits with Hix’ (2002: 688) distinction between two dimensions of voting behavior in the European 
Parliament, one depending on parties, the other depending on nations. 
Table 2 Correlation Matrix: Characteristic Features of Countries with Shareholder 
Oriented Corporate Governance Systems 
 La Porta  
et al. index 
Transparency Ownership 
concentration
Hall /Gin-
gerich index 
Employment 
protection 
La Porta et al. index – 0.445
(n=20) 
0.684*
(n=21)
.743*
(n=19) 
.46
(n=21)
Transparency – – 0.634*
(n=20)
0.4
(n=18) 
0.497
(n=20)
Ownership 
concentration 
– – – 0.599
(n=19) 
0.586*
(n=21)
Hall /Gingerich index – – – – 0.731*
(n=19)
Pearsons r. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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The mid-1980s saw the start of a set of reforms in German stock market and company regulation (Cioffi 
2002; Cioffi/Stephen 2000; Deeg 2001: 26–29; Lütz 2000; Ziegler 2000), initiated by a discussion on the 
quality of Germany as a location of production (Wirtschaftsstandort Deutschland). In the first phase, 
when the underdevelopment of the national capital market was increasingly seen as a comparative disad-
vantage, the aim of these reforms was not to change the German corporate governance system fundamen-
tally, but to add a more active capital market to the unaltered attributes of the economic system. The qual-
ity of reforms changed in the late 1990s, when the coherence of economic policy seemed to vanish and in-
terlocking directorates, insider-oriented accounting standards and limited minority protection turned out 
to be inconsistent with the political goals of the “competition state” (Cerny 1997). The reforms of the late 
1990s were not harmless, minor reforms like the introduction of electronic stock trading in 1989, but went 
straight to the heart of the German corporate governance system (Beyer/Höpner 2003). 
 
I have distinguished three reform complexes. The first complex concerns transparency, management ac-
countability and minority shareholder protection and was affected by the 1998 Corporate Sector Super-
vision and Transparency Act (KonTraG, Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmens-
bereich), by the 1998 Raising of Capital Act (KapAEG, Kapitalaufnahmeerleichterungsgesetz), by the 
work of the “Cromme Commission” that developed the Corporate Governance Codex published in 2001, 
Table 3 Determinants of Voting Behaviora 
Variable Prediction Equation 
Constant  124.681 
(70.772) 
Ideological affiliation  22.743*** 
(3.354) 
La Porta et al. index  13.388** 
(6.904) 
Party in national  
government 
 8.853 
(9.439) 
Country size 2001  0.301 
(0.223) 
GDP growth 1995–
2001 
 0.908 
(0.873) 
Transparency  0.819 
(0.693) 
Ownership concentra-
tion 
 60.103 
57.853 
Hall /Gingerich index   0.337 
(0.265) 
Employment protection  0.795 
(7.602) 
N  75 
R2 (adj.)  0.550 
OLS Regression Results with standard errors in parentheses. Missing
values: see definitions and sources of variables; variables excluded pair-
wise.   
***p<0.01, **p<0.05. Software: SPSS. 
a Dependent variable: Percentages of subgroup members that voted 
in agreement with the takeover directive. 
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and by the 2002 Corporate Sector Transparency and Publicity Act (TransPuG, Gesetz zur Transparenz 
und Publizität im Unternehmensbereich). The second complex concerns the dismantling of interlocking 
capital, which was advanced and accelerated by the 2000 change to the Corporate Income Tax Law (Kör-
perschaftssteuergesetz) that totally abolished the tax on profits from the sales of large share blocks. The 
third reform complex is takeover regulation, which concerns the discussion on the abandoned EU direc-
tive and the 2001 Takeover Law (Gesetz zur Regelung von öffentlichen Angeboten zum Erwerb von Wert-
papieren und Unternehmensübernahmen). What the three corporate governance reform complexes have 
in common is that they were connected, to some extent, with the creation of a market for corporate con-
trol, because the implementation of the “one share, one vote” rule, the disentanglement process and a reli-
able takeover regulation are all preconditions for company control through takeover markets. Some of the 
reforms implemented were passed in consensus, while parties were in conflict over others. Comparison of 
the corporate governance reforms shows that, when parties were at variance, the SPD favored market en-
forcement more than the CDU, which is inconsistent with the partisan hypothesis and the expectation that 
Social Democrats and trade unions prevent firms from developing tools to close the gap between share-
holders and managers (Roe 2001). 
 
3.1 The KonTraG Reform of 1998 
 
The KonTraG was passed in 1998 and represented the first significant change of direction in German cor-
porate governance regulation. Beside some limited modifications to supervisory board regulation, risk 
management and bank ownership of industrial capital, this capital-market-oriented law legalized share 
buybacks, facilitated the introduction of stock options and, above all, abolished unequal voting rights. As 
a result, Germany was one of the precursors of the “one share, one vote” rule in Europe, which was of 
importance in the 2000 takeover battle between Vodafone and Mannesmann. In its commentary on the 
law, the Federal Ministry of Justice took the historical step of abolishing the stakeholder view of the firm 
(which had been written down in the Stock Corporation Act [AktG, Aktiengesetz] of 1937 and approved 
by the Federal Constitutional Court in 1979) and of introducing a shareholder-oriented view, stating that 
it had no alternative but to introduce this reorientation (see Beyer/Höpner 2003). Another significant de-
velopment in 1998 was the passage of a controversial law that allowed stock corporations to adopt capi-
tal-market-oriented accounting standards (IAS or US-GAAP) instead of the rules of the German Commer-
cial Code (HGB, Handelsgesetzbuch), thereby effectively deregulating accounting. Corporate governance 
reform continued with the 2002 TransPuG, which obliged stock corporations to publish a yearly statement 
in order to explain whether or not – and, if not, why – they accepted the corporate governance codex of 
the Cromme Commission, in addition to some further provisions to strengthen the rights of supervisory 
boards in their interaction with management boards. 
 
How did the political parties behave in the debates on the KonTraG? The main driving force behind this 
corporate governance reform was the smaller CDU coalition partner, the FDP, the German Free Democratic 
(Liberal) Party. When the KonTraG was debated in the Bundestag, the FDP speaker Otto Graf Lambsdorff 
said that the law was only a partial success for the FDP, and he regretted that the FDP was not able to push 
the CDU toward further liberalization in the exhausting coalition negotiations. Germany, Graf Lambsdorff 
said, is a rent-seeking society, and German companies need more pressure exerted from capital markets.12 
The CDU speaker Joachim Gres opposed this, by saying that a change of direction in German corporate 
governance was neither intended nor necessary. “Constancy,” he said, “is important in economic policy. 
… Please don’t think that the job of economic policy makers is to permanently introduce new ideas,” and 
                                                   
12See Otto Graff Lambsdorff in the debate over the KonTraG, minutes of the Bundestag debate 13/220 from March 
5, 1998. The translated quotation that follows below is by the author, Martin Höpner, as are all other translations in 
this paper. 
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he insisted that the notion of a “Germany Inc.” built upon quasi-cartels had no equivalence in reality 
(ibid.). And Hartmut Schauerte from the CDU insisted that it was pure ideology to say one should restrict 
the power of German banks, as it was politics that pleased banks to intervene in industrial crises (ibid.). 
 
So far, this is consistent with the partisan hypothesis. The similarity ends, however, when we turn to 
Hans-Martin Bury, the corporate governance expert of the SPD who introduced its own corporate gov-
ernance reform blueprint (see also Cioffi 2002). He called the KonTraG a placebo law to appease the de-
mands of the public without introducing any substantial change, a law to protect managers and banks. The 
German corporate sector, Bury argued, suffers from the power of banks, interlocking directorates, a lack 
of transparency, and disabled company control by the capital market, which leads to a lack of innovation. 
He cited critics who called these “encrustations” the “sovietization of the German economy” and de-
manded a prohibition of industrial stock ownership of banks and more company control by capital mar-
kets (ibid.). Similarly, the SPD expert Eckehard Pick said that the protection of shareholders and the fur-
ther development of the capital market were important goals for the SPD (ibid.). Margarete Wolf, speaking 
for the Green Party, concurred, criticized the power of banks and said that the share market has to be 
transformed into a market for corporate control (ibid.). And even a speaker of the post-communist PDS, 
Uwe-Ernst Heuer, made the criticism that interlocking capital turns the economic order upside down. 
More corporate control by the capital market, he said, would accommodate the ideas of the PDS on devel-
oping democracy, and it would revitalize the economy.13 In this debate, the CDU turned out to be the only 
party protecting “Rhenish capitalism” (Albert 1993), having no other political ally anymore. 
 
The behavior of the parliamentary left was supported by trade unions. They welcomed the KonTraG – in-
cluding the abolition of unequal voting rights –, followed by the Corporate Governance Codex of the 
Cromme Commission (in which trade union representatives were incorporated) and the TransPuG, as well 
as the KapAEG that allowed companies to publish IAS and US-GAAP balance sheets instead of using the 
HGB accounting rules. Trade unions demanded (and still demand) a European directive to make the IAS 
standards incumbent on all German companies, not just stock-listed corporations, and also call for laws to 
enforce the determinations of the Corporate Governance Codex juristically (see Bolt 2000; Köstler 2000; 
Köstler /Müller 2001; Küller 1997; Putzhammer/Köstler 2002; Scheibe-Lange/Prangenberg 1997; 
Schmoldt 2002).14 
 
3.2 After 1998: Corporate Tax Reform and Takeover Regulation 
 
A manifest explanation for this puzzling constellation might be that there was simply a government-
opposition dynamic in force that made the opposition criticize the (feigned) impotence shown by the gov-
ernment over introducing far-reaching reforms. It should be noted that the other two important corporate 
governance reforms were passed after the change in government in late 1998, when CDU and FDP were in 
opposition and SPD and Green Party were in government; still, the CDU was most likely to be the party of 
“German capitalism” (Streeck 1995). As there was a broad consensus over the recommendations of the 
Cromme Commission, the 2002 TransPuG was not as much disputed as the 1998 KonTraG was. Nonethe-
less, it was the CDU that suggested constancy in corporate governance regulation. In the Bundestag debate 
                                                   
13 Ibid. In the 2002 Bundestag debate over the TransPuG, the same PDS speaker argued that Germany had to catch 
up with international corporate governance standards. “There’s much more to do in German corporate governance 
reform and shareholder protection. Let’s do it together!” Minutes of the Bundestag debate 14/231 from April 19, 
2002. 
14Please note that Roland Köstler, Michael Müller and Arno Prangenberg – unlike Marie Bolt, Hans-Detlev Küller, 
Heinz Putzhammer, Ingrid Scheibe-Lange and Hubertus Schmoldt – are not trade union officials, but experts who 
advise trade unions. 
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on the TransPuG, the only speaker who cast some doubts on the current developments was Susanne Tie-
mann of the CDU who said that “no matter if we like it or not: shareholder value also concerns German 
corporations,” and she advised against accounting reforms that might be later abolished by EU regulation, 
as it was risky to jeopardize continuity in corporate regulation.15 
 
In the late 1980s, an extensive restructuring of the German corporate network began which picked up 
speed in the mid-1990s. Between 1996 and 2000, the number of capital ties between the one hundred big-
gest corporations declined from 169 to 80,16 and the large financial companies of Deutsche Bank and 
Dresdner Bank in particular moved from the network center to a more peripheral network position. It had 
long been discussed how politics could force the dismantling of interlocking capital, especially industrial 
capital held by banks. There were two possible options to choose from. The first was to forbid banks from 
owning more than five percent of industrial companies. Critics of this view – though they shared the view 
that interlocking capital should be dismantled – insisted that this was only possible in combination with 
lower taxes on profits from the sale of share blocks, which was the second possible course of action. Oth-
erwise, it was argued, a law against industrial ownership of financial companies would be an expropria-
tion act.17 
 
It was a political surprise for all observers including capital market participants that the Schröder gov-
ernment opted for the total abolition of this corporate income tax (Körperschaftssteuer) in the context of 
the 2000 Tax Reduction Act (Steuersenkungsgesetz) without hurting banks with any prohibition act. The 
motivation for this reform was explicitly to abolish interlocking capital and, as a consequence, to change 
the corporate governance mechanisms and to create a more active market for corporate control. Beside the 
“systemic” redistribution consequences postulated in this article (i.e. the tax abolition should speed up 
network dissolution, which should lead to a growing number of companies exposed to the market for con-
trol, which in turn should increase shareholder orientation by causing a reorientation in the conflict of 
aims between company and profitability growth, which then should redistribute welfare from employees 
to shareholders), the abolition of the corporate income tax on profits from share block sales, sometimes 
called the “Eichel Plan,” had obvious immediate distributional consequences. When the insurance com-
pany Allianz sold their 13.6 percentage equity stake in Hypovereinsbank in 2002 and earned 2 billions of 
euros as a result, there was no profit tax raised for this. This “tax gift” for the big financial corporations 
led to a massive conflict between political parties, in which the SPD and the Greens were opposed by the 
CDU and the PDS, with the FDP caught between the ideological positions. 
 
In the Bundestag debate over the Tax Reduction Act in May 2000, the opposition parties criticized the 
fact that SPD and Greens had redistributed in favor of large stock companies, while not assisting the small 
corporations (Mittelstand). CDU, FDP and PDS members of parliament applauded the CDU speaker Peter 
Rauen when he said that he could not believe it when he heard that finance minister Hans Eichel planned 
to abolish this tax totally, pointing out that the SPD and trade union protest would have been enormous if 
the former CDU-FDP coalition had introduced this reform.18 The CSU member of parliament Gerda Has-
selfeldt said that the reform lacked any idea of fairness (ibid.), and the popular speaker of the postcommu-
nist PDS, Gregor Gysi, received applause from the CDU and FDP groups when he said: 
 
                                                   
15See Susanne Tiemann in the minutes of the Bundestag debate 14/231 from April 19, 2002. 
16Data source: Monopolkommission. 
17See Otto Graf Lambsdorff in the debate on the KonTraG, minutes of the Bundestag debate 13/220 from March 5, 
1998. 
18See Peter Rauen in the debate over the Steuersenkungsgesetz, minutes of the Bundestag debate 14/105 from May 
18, 2000. 
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Our government is lead by Social Democrats. How can I explain the following to the citi-
zens? If a baker sells his bread shop, the state wants taxes. If Deutsche Bank sells share 
blocks, the Social Democrat government says they don’t want a single Pfennig as tax. I 
can’t understand this. What’s social democratic about that? (ibid.) 
 
In this debate, SPD speakers like Lothar Binding were on the defensive when they explained their political 
goal to reform the corporate governance system by speeding up network dissolution.19 Edmund Stoiber, 
who was the conservative candidate for Chancellor in the 2002 election, used this issue in his election 
campaign and announced his intention of reintroducing the tax as Chancellor, which was welcomed by 
trade union speakers, who said that “it seems like Stoiber found such ideas in trade union manifestos,” 
while industrial representatives opposed Stoiber and wanted to protect this “good and important innova-
tion” (see “heute online,” 20.4.2002). 
 
The third important corporate governance reform issue is takeover regulation. After the failure of the 
European directive, the Schröder government introduced a national takeover law in October 2001, which 
was less liberal than the Commission’s proposal for two reasons: it allowed the target company’s board to 
take defensive measures if it had sought the shareholders’ authorization no earlier than eighteen months 
before the bid, and it allowed supervisory boards to legitimize defensive measures (see §33 of the law). 
However, this law was definitely no “anti-takeover law” as liberal critics claimed it to be. The law still 
provides a regular playground for (friendly or hostile) takeovers, and it should be mentioned that most 
other countries provide more privatized companies with “golden shares” than Germany does. After dec-
ades of a virtual absence of hostile takeover attempts, the “hostile” trade of large share blocks is now ac-
cepted in Germany, which includes acceptance by the legislator (see also Cioffi 2002). 
 
The crucial point here is the difference in party attitudes. Differences were smaller compared to the con-
flicts over the 1998 KonTraG and the 2000 Tax Reduction Act, but they existed and were emphasized. 
The FDP criticized the takeover law as not being liberal enough. Rainer Funke from the FDP said in the 
Bundestag debate, “the chancellor gave in to the pressures of trade unions and managers who protect their 
benefices against international competition” and called the takeover law provincial,20 which is not surpris-
ing, but consistent with the ideological affiliation hypothesis. Once again, the CDU turned out to be the de-
fender of Germany Inc. The CDU expert Hartmut Schauerte welcomed the failure of the European take-
over directive and said that it was primarily the CDU that had criticized the European directive as being 
too liberal. In addition to this, he also argued that the German takeover law failed to allow enough defen-
sive measures to be taken by managers in order to prevent hostile takeovers. The eighteen-month period 
allowed for shareholders’ authorization resolutions, he argued, was too short and should be replaced by a 
36-month period. In the negotiations of the responsible Parliamentary Financial Committee (Finanzauss-
chuss des Deutschen Bundestages), the CDU also wanted to decrease the 75 percent threshold provided for 
the resolutions of the shareholders’ meetings.21 In opposition to this, the SPD speaker Nina Hauer said that 
“the shareholders own the corporation and should have the final say,”22 and Andrea Fischer from the 
                                                   
19Ibid. – In a letter (No. XIV/2002) for the members of the CDU/CSU faction in the Bundestag, faction chairman 
Friedrich Merz wrote with respect to the crisis of the engineering company Babcock: “This is the disentanglement of 
Germany Inc. – a SPD type of disentanglement: the jewels are bought by Americans, the rest goes bankrupt” 
(online). 
20See Rainer Funke in the debate on the takeover law, minutes of the Bundestag debate 14/192 from October 11, 
2001. 
21See Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Finanzausschusses, Drucksache 14/7477, November 14, 2001. 
22See Nina Hauer in the debate on the takeover law, minutes of the Bundestag debate 14/201 from November 15, 
2001. 
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Green Party declared that the German takeover law might be much more liberal than it appears, as many 
companies might abandon implementing the ex ante shareholders meetings’ resolutions on defensive 
measures by management boards.23 Trade unions, by and large, supported the SPD attitude, as they pre-
ferred to allow codetermined supervisory boards to legitimize defensive measures. The PDS decided to ab-
stain from voting in the Bundestag ballot on the takeover law. 
 
In summary, the attitudes of the German political parties toward the main corporate governance reforms 
since the late 1990s – the KonTraG, the KapAEG, the TransPuG, the abolition of the corporate income tax 
on profits from the sales of share blocks, and the Takeover Law – show a distinct pattern that is inconsis-
tent with the ideological affiliation hypothesis. When differences in party positions occurred, Social De-
mocrats favored more liberalization than the Christian Democrats and were closer to the attitudes of the 
FDP than the CDU was. The CDU, not the SPD, turned out to be the party of “Rhenish” capitalism. Taking 
the distributional outcomes of corporate governance liberalization into account, this paradox outcome 
contradicts the expectations of partisan theory. Are there any explanations for this discrepancy? 
 
4 Where Does the Paradox Come From? 
 
In this section, two explanations for the party paradox will be discussed: The historical conversion of 
ideas and the importance of conflicts over managerial control. 
 
4.1 Historical Conversion of Ideas 
 
I begin this argument by distinguishing two very different leftist views on interlocking capital as a main 
feature of organized capitalism. The first view was expressed by Lenin (1985/1917) and shared by most 
German socialists, including the early Hilferding. In his theory on imperialism, Lenin described German 
capitalism as a mixture between monopoly and competition, mostly driven by interlocking capital and in-
terlocking directorates from the large German banks (Lenin 1985/1917: 45–50), which resulted in a con-
centration of capitalist power to the detriment of labor. Consequently, the centers of interlocking capital 
were seen as natural points of attack in the revolutionary endeavors of socialists and communists. This 
line of argumentation was further developed by supporters of the theory of “state monopoly capitalism” 
(Staatsmonopolistischer Kapitalismus – Stamokap) that was influential in German leftist movements, in-
cluding parts of the SPD, at least until the late 1970s. In the Stamokap view, Lenin’s theory on imperial-
ism resulted in the strategy of building an “anti-monopolistic force” in formal agreement with other socie-
tal movements that disapproved of the entanglement and monopolization of financial and industrial capi-
tal (Esser 1998: 620; Huffschmid 1995: 2). A non-monopolistic capitalism was seen as an intermediate 
stage on the way toward socialism. 
 
In the 1920s, this view lost ground in the discussions of the trade unions and the SPD and was replaced by 
a view that was expressed by socialist theorists like Naphtali and the late Hilferding. Both, together with 
other theorists like Sinzheimer, were asked by the board of the German trade union organization, the 
ADGB (Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverband – German General Workers Association), to develop a 
conception of the trade union’s view on organized capitalism and on adequate leftist responses. The out-
come was the 1928 book on “economic democracy” (Naphtali 1969/1928) that soon dominated the so-
cialist discussion. Naphtali and his commission argued: 
 
                                                   
23See Andrea Fischer in the debate on the takeover law, minutes of the Bundestag debate 14/192 from October 11, 
2001. 
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This complete organization of capitalism, this onward development of free competition to-
ward planned production with the aim of a monopolistic market formation is not a democ-
ratization process … However, although we do not wish to camouflage the capitalist char-
acter of the new form of organization, we believe that this development will result in an 
impulse for the development of economic democracy, and we believe that this development 
has already begun. [emphasis by the author] (Naphtali 1969/1928: 35–36) 
 
They emphasized the interpenetration of the modern economic and political spheres, in opposition to the 
Leninist view, and believed that the competition-impeding organization of capital could be used as a tool 
to oblige corporations to act in accordance with societal goals. Consequently, the Naphtali commission re-
jected ideas that trade unions should call for the disentanglement of organized capital by the state. This, 
said the commission, would be a backward, not a forward, move (Naphtali 1969/1928: 37). Hilferding, in 
line with Naphtali, wrote that the innovation of organized capitalism was that corporations had ceased to 
be the private affair of capitalists, and that this introduced the socialist principle of planned production 
into a capitalist economy (Hilferding 1924). Such ideas were widely accepted by the late Weimar trade 
union and SPD movements, and Hilferding presented the new view on organized capitalism at the 1927 
SPD party congress in Kiel, akin to Naphtali who gave his famous speech on economic democracy at the 
1928 German trade union congress in Hamburg. 
 
In order to understand the current trade union and SPD attitude toward interlocking, organized capital, it is 
crucial to conceive that these ideas were driven in new directions at two historical junctures. The Hil-
ferding-Naphtali view on organized capitalism did not survive World War II. As to the collaboration of 
the center of interlocking capital with the Nazi regime and its important role in war preparation, the trade 
unions stopped their opposition to disentanglement. In their second nation-wide conference with represen-
tatives from the different Allied occupied districts in December 1946, the trade unions expressed the view 
that “both world wars have shown that the war-enforcing pressure came from the concentration of capital-
ist power in monopolies, cartels, trusts and horizontal economic groups and the malpractice of their 
power.”24 In his famous speech at the Munich founding congress of the Federation of German Trade Un-
ions in October 1949, trade union leader Hans Böckler declared, “it must never happen again that eco-
nomic agglomerations, transformed into political power, destroy a democratic constitution, as happened 
to the Republic of Weimar” (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund 1989/1949: 202). Beside the nationalization 
of main industries, the trade unions called for a consistent disentanglement of capital in their first mani-
festo (Leminsky/Otto 1974: 248) and, later, fiercely attacked both the reform of concentration and inter-
locking capital that happened in the 1950s and the powerless anti-cartel policy of the Adenauer govern-
ment. With respect to the 1957 Act Against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbe-
schränkungen), the trade unions organized a mass demonstration in Dortmund in November 1958, voicing 
the opinion that “the concentration of economic power again starts to endanger the democratic state.”25 In 
short, the trade unions had definitely ceased to favor interlocking capital over separated, competing eco-
nomic units. 
 
This reorientation was not undisputed. In 1950, galvanized by various draft laws over competition policy, 
the trade unions’ attitude was discussed in the monthly trade union discussion forum “Gewerkschaftliche 
Monatshefte.” Rolf Wagenführ, in line with the Hilferding-Naphtali approach, argued: “Trade unionists 
should not favor atomization, but organization of markets. But organization implies not disentanglement 
but the perpetuation, and even the creation, of interlocking capital” (Wagenführ 1950). But such expres-
sions were an exception to the rule, and a majority of trade unionists and Social Democrats developed a 
                                                   
24Quote from Weiss-Hartmann/Hecker (1977: 291). 
25Quote from Deppe (1977: 379–380). 
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strong preference for anti-cartel competition policy.26 This does not mean that trade unions and Social 
Democrats favored liberal market economies in the 1950s. They still were socialist movements, and their 
prevailing idea on “economic democracy” was a mixed economy consisting of a large nationalized eco-
nomic sector in addition to a private sector under a strong competition regime without interlocking capi-
tal, supplemented by a sector with public ownership – but not state ownership, rather collective (genos-
senschaftlich) ownership – including trade union ownership (Gemeinwirtschaft). Concentrated and inter-
locked, “organized,” capital was no longer a welcome intermediate stage on the way to this goal. 
 
Of course, the story does not end here. The late 1950s witnessed a second reorientation, clearly articulated 
in the November 1959 Godesberg manifesto of the SPD, when socialism was finally abandoned as the 
ultimate aim of the Social Democrats and the nationalization of main industries was no longer a political 
goal. Trade unions reproduced the same reorientation in their 1963 Düsseldorf manifesto. At this point, 
the still surviving idea of disentanglement lost its socialist background, and my argument is that this 
conversion of ideology led to a liberal attitude that was formerly constructed as a part of a socialist idea. 
In the 1963 Düsseldorf manifesto, and in all the manifestos that followed, trade unions called for 
disentanglement, the abolition of concentration-enforcing tax policies and, above all, the reduction of the 
power of the banks by state policy (Haferkampp 1966: 10; Leminsky/Otto 1974: 252). In 1966, a liberal 
observer concluded, “the manifestos of the SPD and trade unions have made, if I may say so, significant 
steps toward neo-liberal ideas” (Gutowski 1966: 17). The crucial point is not that trade unions and Social 
Democrats did away with leftist ideas, but that a conversion of ideas set in that redefined what it meant to 
be leftist in the context of an organized economy. Leftist thinking took a more liberal direction, and this 
attitude survived in the SPD, which claimed in its 1989 Berlin manifesto “in order to repress the power of 
banks and insurance companies, we favor the disentanglement of capital ties between companies” 
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands 1998: 46).27 This is the historical reason why the Social 
Democrats arrived at attitudes like the call to forbid banks to own more than five percent of industrial 
companies, which fitted exactly with calls from such quarters as the neo-liberal Monopoly Commission 
(Monopolkommission 1976, 1998) and Free Democrats like Graf Lambsdorff (1989: 81–82), and why 
Social Democrats favor more corporate governance liberalization than the Christian Democrats. 
 
In the golden years of German organized capitalism, the SPD-FDP government between 1974 and 1982 
also used organized capital as a vehicle to reach common goals. Banks and insurance companies were of-
ten directly forced to invest in industrial firms, sometimes even in conflict – in order, for example, to pre-
vent takeovers from oil-producing companies in the 1970s (Mercedes-Benz), to prevent the disintegration 
of companies (Gerling) and to prevent bankruptcies (AEG, Holzmann) (see examples in Beyer 2002, 
Streeck/Höpner 2003). Above all, the protection against hostile takeovers that was mainly arranged by fi-
nancial corporations allowed industrial companies to persist in a low profitability – low market capitaliza-
tion equilibrium that provided room to maneuver for huge company growth and diversification strategies, 
which in turn allowed the German industrial sector to absorb a greater element of the labor force com-
pared to other countries, despite the fact that the overall labor- market participation rate was below aver-
age (Höpner/Jackson 2001). And, of course, the unions were also part of organized capitalism and prof-
ited from its steering capacity. For experts like Shonfield (1965) and Zysman (1983), the power of Ger-
man banks was a functional equivalent to the high degree of state intervention seen in the French system. 
                                                   
26See the statement of the Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte editorial office (1950). 
27As Green parties favor a decentralized economic structure, they also fit into the critique on organized capital. In 
their first Sindelfinger party manifesto from 1983, they called for the disintegration of big companies; in their recent 
Berlin party manifesto, they express the view that “monopolies and oligopolies can only be abolished if a strong 
merger control, a cartel supervision and an effective disentanglement policy for regional, national, and European 
markets are in existence. We want a functioning competition in favor of customers” (Bündnis 90/Grüne 2002: 50). 
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But, where political demands were concerned, trade unions and Social Democrats treated a Hilferding-
Naphtali economy as if it was a Lenin-Stamokap economy, favoring the disorganization of capitalism on 
the capital side, in combination with codetermination and strong trade union influence on the labor rela-
tions side. 
 
4.2 The Importance of Conflicts Over Managerial Control 
 
My second argument removes the discussion to the company level. I start theoretically by combining two 
different views on conflicts inside the firm that normally fail to address each other. While the industrial 
relations literature emphasizes different interests of employers and employees, principal-agent theory 
points to different interests of shareholders and insiders. By combining these conflict dimensions into one 
model, we arrive at a triangle, consisting of three interest groups, three conflict lines, and three different 
coalition lines in which two of the groups distinguished can form a coalition against the third one (see 
Figure 3). I define the conflict constellation in which shareholders oppose managers and employees as an 
insider-outsider conflict, the conflict in which shareholders and employees build a coalition against man-
agers as a conflict over managerial control, and the conflict in which employees oppose the two other 
groups as a class conflict. This is still a simple conflict model, but it is much more realistic than both the 
principal-agent view and the industrial relations view on conflicts inside firms. 
 
The class conflict view is the one that fits with the left-right dimension. If capital-market-oriented reforms 
strengthen the position of employees’ opponents in class conflicts, trade unions should refuse such re-
forms. The same holds true for insider-outsider conflicts. But, opposed to this, employees and their works 
councils and trade unions turn out to be on the winning side if increased shareholder power is played out 
in conflicts over managerial control. By emphasizing class conflicts and conflicts over managerial con-
trol, I argue that the losses in class conflicts are – for several reasons – less visible compared to the gains 
from conflicts over managerial control, which makes trade unions support capital-market-oriented corpo-
rate governance reforms more than one might possibly expect. While changes in class constellation “only” result 
in redistribution, but leave the institutions of codetermination and central collective agreements intact, 
Figure 3 Three Types of Coalitions and Conflicts between Shareholders, Employees, 
and Managementsa
Shareholders
Class conflict
Employees
Conflicts over 
managerial control
Insider/outsider
conflicts
Management
Adapted from Höpner 2001.
a Example: In conflicts over managerial control,
both shareholders and employees oppose managers.
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changes in the organization of conflicts over managerial control result in much more visible, institutional 
change. 
 
The center of class conflict is the distributional conflict. As increased shareholder protection and, in par-
ticular, the emergence of a market for corporate control strengthen the power of shareholders, one might 
expect a process of redistribution of net value added in firms that adjust to the new pressures by increas-
ing their shareholder orientation. Beyer and Hassel (2002) found evidence that such a development is ac-
tually in process: in shareholder-oriented German companies, the share of net value added that employees 
receive as wages is in decline, while dividend payments toward shareholders are on the rise. I will come 
back to this, but prefer to examine conflicts over managerial control before doing so. 
 
The share of conflicts inside firms that manifest themselves as conflicts over managerial control is sur-
prisingly high. One of the crucial points in shareholder value is company transparency, and disclosure 
conflicts are conflicts over managerial control. Trade unionists interpret company transparency as a pre-
condition and a tool for codetermination. Consequently, trade unions call for a European directive that 
should abolish German Commercial Code (HGB) accounting. The only works council I know that opposed 
international accounting is the Volkswagen works council – Volkswagen is codetermined to such an ex-
tent that the works council sees no need to pass more information toward outsiders. Both TransPuG and 
KonTraG concerned management accountability in management board-supervisory board interaction. As 
the supervisory board and not the management board is the codetermined institution, every increase in su-
pervisory board rights is an increase in the degree of codetermination and is, of course, warmly welcomed 
by works councils and trade unions. The field of common interests of shareholders and employees turns 
out to be even larger, when considering that both shareholders and employees prefer variable to constant 
management payment. In general, German trade unions and works councils distrust managerial behavior. 
The managers’ freedom of action in diversification and company growth also gives them more room to 
maneuver for prestige investments. “If shareholder value helps to limit this risk potential, this must be in 
the interest of employees,” says one trade union expert (Küller 1997: 529). 
 
Why is redistribution, as compared to this institutional change, less visible? There are two different ways 
in which such redistribution could happen. The first possible way is downward pressure on wages, which 
would result in enormous opposition to shareholder value, but which is not the way in which redistribu-
tion normally happens. Rather, redistribution results from a reorientation in the conflict of aims between 
company growth and profitability growth. Beyer and Hassel (2002) have shown that shareholder-oriented 
firms increase profitability targets and halt company growth, which is compatible with rising wages of 
core employees, who are not affected by rising employment insecurities. Why may core employees’ 
wages rise, while the share of net value added that employees receive is in decline? Kurdelbusch (2002) 
has shown that there is a strong empirical connection between shareholder orientation and the introduc-
tion of non-management variable pay. Consider a shareholder-oriented firm that halts company growth 
and sells less-than-average profitable subunits in order to raise average profitability: when a part of em-
ployees’ wages is variable according to company profitability, the number of employees will decrease, 
while their wages may increase – which, perversely, creates an incentive for works councils to tolerate 
such restructurings, as works councils tend to be dominated by core employees and not by employees on 
the periphery of corporations. Further mechanisms exist that absorb redistribution conflicts resulting from 
shareholder orientation, and the most important one is early retirement, which allows companies to shift 
the social costs of restructuring28 toward welfare state institutions (Ebbinghaus 2001; Mares 2000). Un-
surprisingly, early retirement is defended by both company and trade union representatives. 
                                                   
28Note in addition that not all conflicts over restructurings are insider-outsider conflicts (in which shareholders force 
insiders to restructure) or class conflicts (in which shareholder pressure helps managers to introduce restructurings 
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However, redistribution occurs in a way that leaves not only the institution of central collective agree-
ments intact, but is also compatible with rising wages of core employees. Different mechanisms, above all 
variable non-management pay and early retirement, absorb the destructive power of class conflict inside 
the firm and allow both works councils and employers to pass negative externalities on to society. By 
contrast, the works councils’ and trade unions’ gains in conflicts over managerial control are much more 
visible and result in institutional change. The importance of conflicts over managerial control is a second 
reason why trade unions and the SPD as their most associated party favor shareholder-oriented reforms. 
The implicit coalition between shareholders and employees in company conflicts over managerial control 
has an obvious analogy in the implicit SPD-FDP coalition in the Bundestag debates on the KonTraG and on 
takeover regulation. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
Do parties matter in corporate governance reform? Why do German Social Democrats opt for more cor-
porate governance liberalization than the CDU, although the distributional outcomes of such reforms 
would expect the converse? I have discussed these questions by dividing my analysis into three parts. 
First, I used the crucial vote over the European takeover directive in July 2001 as a test case, since each 
relevant European party had to decide on the same liberalization attempt at the same time, and everyone 
knew that the voting result would be extremely close. Two variables turned out to be important predictors 
of European MEPs’ voting behavior: ideological affiliation – parties actually matter in corporate govern-
ance reform – and class and party cohesive national interests that result from the fact that the institution-
alization of a European-wide market for corporate control would have asymmetric distributional out-
comes, not only within but also between member states. The large parties tended to vote with regard to 
this dimension of interests. I used the capital market orientation of national corporate governance regimes 
as a proxy variable to estimate such nation-based, party cohesive interest dimension. 
 
In a second step, I focused on the German case and discussed the parties-do-matter thesis with respect to 
the main German corporate governance reforms of the 1990s. The decisive measures were the abolition of 
unequal voting rights, company transparency, management accountability, takeover regulation, and disen-
tanglement policies. I found that German parties behaved “paradoxically” in the sense that the SPD fa-
vored more liberalization and was nearer to the neo-liberal positions of the FDP, the Monopoly Commis-
sion and liberal economists than the CDU was. In respect of the corporate governance sphere, the CDU, not 
the SPD, turned out to be the party of “Rhenish,” “organized” capitalism. 
 
In the third part of the paper, I offered explanations for the unexpected behavior shown by the SPD (and, 
in part, also the trade unions) toward corporate governance liberalization. The first argument referred to 
the conversion of leftist ideas in the course of the twentieth century. In the second half of the Weimar Re-
public, it was common within the SPD and the trade unions to view organized, entangled capital as a part 
of the most developed (and, therefore, favorable) model of capitalism. Two watersheds fundamentally 
changed this view. Because of the collaboration of the capital entanglement center with Hitler and its role 
in the preparations for World War II, post-war trade unions and Social Democrats began to favor a strong 
anti-cartel policy, combined with a large nationalized and a large immediate sector (economic democracy 
– Wirtschaftsdemokratie). When the SPD (in the 1959 Godesberg manifesto) and the Federation of Ger-
                                                                                                                                                                    
that they would have preferred anyway). There are also constellations, as in the Mannesmann case, where both 
works councils and shareholders preferred to split up the conglomerate, but were opposed by managers who had a 
preference for a big and powerful company. In such cases, even conflicts over restructurings are conflicts over 
managerial control. 
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man Trade Unions (in the 1963 Düsseldorf manifesto) abandoned the idea of nationalizing core sectors, 
the preference for disentanglement remained. These reinterpretations of political goals introduced a lib-
eral attitude into leftist thinking. Thus, the historical goal of the German Left was a liberalized corporate 
governance regime on the one hand, in combination with a “non-liberal” industrial relations regime with 
centralized wage-bargaining institutions, codetermination, and strong unions on the other hand. 
 
I focused on the company level to find a further explanation for the preference – in this case, of trade un-
ions – for corporate governance liberalization. By combining the conflict models of principal-agent litera-
ture and industrial relations literature into one model, I distinguished different types of conflict inside the 
firm and found that the conflict type in which works councils and trade unions find themselves on the 
winning side of corporate governance liberalization – the “conflict over managerial control” – is of rela-
tively high importance. Increased disclosure and increased management accountability with respect to the 
supervisory boards result in increasing degrees of employee codetermination. In contrast to this, different 
mechanisms absorb the conflict potential of redistribution as a result of shareholder orientation. As em-
ployees on the peripheries of companies tend to lose from shareholder value strategies, variable parts of 
wages in the core units are likely to increase. This kind of redistribution leaves the institution of central 
collective agreements intact. Early retirement is another absorption mechanism that decreases sensitivity 
to losses in class conflicts, compared to gains in conflicts over managerial control. 
 
These findings have important theoretical implications. First, parties do actually matter in corporate gov-
ernance reform. As corporate governance is one of the main sectors that constitute different models of 
capitalism, parties have to be taken into account in the discussion on the forces that change the models of 
capitalism. Another, quite different path of party influence on the organizational degree of production re-
gimes has been identified by Iversen and Soskice (2002). They argue that welfare state arrangements, de-
veloped by political coalitions that involve leftist parties, are a precondition for employees’ investments 
in firm-specific skills. This argument links party politics, the welfare state, and skill formation (see also 
Gourevitch 2002). My analysis shows that a further path of party influence exists. 
 
Second, as shown for the German case, I have demonstrated that the conventional wisdom on party be-
havior in welfare state design should not be generalized toward corporate governance reform, which was 
one of the most dynamic economic policy fields in the 1990s. Here, paradoxically, the SPD is not the par-
ty of “politics against markets.” As the political importance of the corporate governance policy field in-
creases, traditional political economy models of left party behavior turn out to be lacking in complexity. 
The SPD might be the interventionist, market-restricting party in questions of labor market policy. But 
with respect to the enforcement of share markets and the conflicts between shareholders and managers, 
the SPD is the market-enforcing party, whereas the CDU is the market-restricting party, which has obvious 
implications for the literature on the interaction of parties and markets. Advanced capitalist societies have 
developed five different markets with different commodities, participants and cycles (Windolf 1994): 
markets for territorial property, product markets, labor markets, capital markets, and markets for corpo-
rate control. Accepted theories of party behavior in a given market like the product market or the labor 
market need not be generalized toward capital markets and markets for corporate control, as political par-
ties can act in a market-restricting manner in one sphere, while simultaneously behaving in a market-
enforcing manner in another sphere. With regard to corporate governance, the explanatory power of tradi-
tional left-right scales is limited – or, alternatively, the classification of some of the parties on this axis as 
it affects this political issue is incorrect. 
 
Third, my analysis raises doubt about the assumption that one single parameter can be found that esti-
mates the impact of parties on the organizational degree of production regimes that not only fits different 
spheres of the political economy, but also different countries. The voting behavior of European parties in 
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the crucial vote over the takeover directive in July 2001 has shown that – beside the existence of a left-
right dimension in corporate governance issues – large center parties tend to rank national interests higher 
than ideological differences. In addition, as I have shown for the German case, it is a consequence of his-
torical experience and of the domestic institutional configuration whether or not corporate governance 
liberalization can be accepted as a part of a leftist idea. For example, it is employees’ codetermination of 
supervisory boards that make trade unions favor more supervisory board power in its interaction with 
managements. In the current state of research, it is an open question whether the described “paradox” 
party constellation also exists in other countries. Analogies to the German constellation may exist in Italy, 
France, and Portugal. 
 
Fourth, the results of my analysis point directly to the problem of institutional complementarity. The theo-
ries concerning different national models of capitalism differ with respect to the degree to which they em-
phasize the coherent organization of subsystems of the political economy, such as the skill formation sys-
tem, the industrial relations system and the corporate governance system. For supporters of the idea of an 
extensive complementarity connecting the subsystems of production regimes, the assessment of the de-
scribed German leftist strategy should be self-evident: it lacks coherence. This view does not allow one to 
favor a liberalized corporate governance regime on the one hand and a “non-liberal” industrial relations 
regime on the other hand. Such a combination lacks stability, and in the event of such an institutional set-
ting being designed, it would be likely to undermine economic success. Obviously, the German Left does 
not believe in the existence of a complementarity that would make a codetermined liberalized production 
regime a contradiction in terms, maybe even an oxymoron, or at best a possible, but incoherent and there-
fore unpromising, combination. 
 
However, it is not immediately clear whether the reason for the incompatibility between the ideas of sci-
entific “models of capitalism” and of German leftist movements lies in the misinterpretations of trade un-
ionists and Social Democrats or of political economists. Some evidence exists for both. There was an ob-
vious incompatibility in the demands of German trade unionists when they wanted to force the Deutsche 
Bank into investing in the construction company Holzmann in order to save the company from bankruptcy 
in 1999, while at the same time supporting the idea of forbidding banks to own more than 5 percent of 
non-financial companies. It is typical of those of a leftist persuasion to have a strong belief in progress, 
since in both the Lenin-Stamokap view and the Naphtali-Hilferding view it was the most developed ver-
sion of capitalism that was meant to lead to socialism. Conservatives, by contrast, typically are sensitive 
to the fragility of institutional arrangements (see Hayek 1948). Consequently, in the Bundestag debate on 
the KonTraG, it was CDU members (and not PDS or FDP members) who pointed out that corporate govern-
ance liberalization might lead to a declining ability on the part of politics to force banks to make invest-
ments in order to reach common goals.29 
 
                                                   
29See Otto Hartmut Schauerte in the debate over the KonTraG, minutes of the Bundestag debate 13/220 from March 
5, 1998. 
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On the other hand, there is also empirical support for the German leftist view, as opposed to the “models 
of capitalism” view. The possibility of a liberalized corporate governance regime combined with a cen-
tralized, strongly unionized industrial relations regime – with extensive employee codetermination rights 
– is empirically proven insofar as precisely this transformation is already in progress in the large com-
pany sector of Germany. In this process of hybrid convergence, codetermination and central collective 
agreements remain stable, and works councils on the one hand and shareholder-oriented company policies 
on the other fit together better than one might have expected (Höpner 2001, 2003). In keeping with their 
political goals, German trade unions and works councils do not see themselves as losers in the new inter-
play of elements that were formerly domiciled in different regime types. 
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Appendix: Definitions and Sources of Variables 
 
Voting behavior: Percentage of members of European Parliament subgroups (British Conservatives, Ital-
ian Greens etc.) who agreed with the takeover directive in the crucial vote at 4 July 2001. Own calcula-
tion: according to the information on the EP website, voting behavior and party group affiliation of each 
member was identified. As 75 party groups were distinguished, n=75. 
Ideological affiliation: Party group affiliation of each subgroup. 1=affiliation with Confederal Group of 
the European United Left /Nordic Green Left or affiliation with Group of the Greens/European Free Alli-
ance; 2=affiliation with Group of the Party of European Socialists; 3=affiliation with Group of the Euro-
pean People’s Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats; 4=affiliation with the Group of the 
European Liberal, Democratic and Reformist Party; 5=affiliation with the Union for Europe of the Na-
tions Group. As affiliations with the Group for a Europe of the Nations Group and with the Technical 
Group of Independent Members were not coded into the ideological affiliation variable, n=67. 
La Porta et al. index: Country-based summary measure of shareholder protection. Index adds one when: 
the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy votes to the firm; shareholders are not required to de-
posit their shares prior to the General Shareholders’ Meeting; cumulative voting or proportional represen-
tation of minorities in the board of directors is allowed; an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; 
the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an Extraordinary Share-
 31
holders’ Meeting is less or equal to 10 percent; shareholders have preemptive rights that can only be 
waived by a shareholders’ vote. Data source: La Porta et al. (2000). As Luxemburg is not coded, n=71. 
Party in national government: Dummy variable. 1=Party was member of national government in July 
2001, 0=Party was in national opposition. Source of information: Fischer Weltalmanach. n=75. 
Country size: Number of national residents in 2001 (millions). Data source: Fischer Weltalmanach. n=
75. 
GDP growth 1995–2001: Growth of GDP between 1995 and 2001. Own calculation. Data source: OECD 
Main Economic Indicators. n=75. 
Transparency: Index on the inclusion or omission of 90 items in the 1990 annual reports. Data source: La 
Porta et al. (1998). As Ireland and Luxemburg are not coded, n=66. 
Ownership concentration: Country-based measure, calculated as the median percentage of common 
shares owned by the largest three shareholders in the 10 largest privately owned non-financial firms. Data 
source: La Porta et al. (1998). As Luxemburg is not coded, n=71. 
Hall /Gingerich index: Index assessing the balance of strategic coordination relative to market coordina-
tion in the political economy, combining data on shareholder power, dispersion of control, size of stock 
market, level of wage coordination, degree of wage coordination, and labor turnover. Data source: Hall 
and Gingerich (2001: 46). As Luxemburg and Greece are not coded, n=68.  
Employment protection: Country-based index on the degree of protection of temporary employment. 
Data source: Nicoletti et al. (2000: 84). As Luxemburg and Greece are not coded, n=68. 
